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ABSTRACT 
 
In this paper, I examine how managers balance multiple incentives. Specifically, 
I investigate whether managers, whose compensation is based on pre-tax performance 
metrics, are less likely to achieve analysts’ after-tax earnings expectations. I also 
examine how investors react to missed analysts’ EPS forecasts when managers’ 
compensation is based on pre-tax metrics. I find that when compensation incentives are 
based on pre-tax performance metrics, managers are less likely to meet analysts’ after-
tax earnings targets. I also find that the negative market reaction for firms that miss 
analysts’ EPS targets is incrementally larger in instances where CEOs’ compensation 
incentives include only pre-tax performance metrics. I add to the literature on executive 
compensation by documenting that firm performance can be influenced by the way in 
which managers balance their multiple incentives. I also contribute to the literature on 
investors’ firm valuation decisions by examining the influence of compensation-specific 
information on the market reaction to firm performance. 
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1. INTRODUCTION  
 
In this paper I investigate whether managers, whose compensation is based on 
pre-tax performance metrics, are less likely to achieve analysts’ after-tax earnings 
expectations. I also examine how investors react to missed analysts’ EPS forecasts when 
managers’ compensation is based on pre-tax metrics. Prior studies show that market 
participants value whether firms meet or beat analysts’ EPS forecasts as indicators of 
firm performance (Bartov et al., 2002; Brown et al., 1987; Kasznick & McNichols, 
2002; Kinney et al., 2002; Matsumoto, 2002; Skinner & Sloan, 2002). Therefore, 
analysts’ EPS forecasts provide managers with implicit incentives to meet this 
benchmark. Managers are also influenced by other incentives, such as those explicitly 
provided by compensation contracts (Balsam, 1998; Gaver et al., 1995; Healy, 1985; 
Holthausen et al, 1995). I examine how managers balance these multiple incentives. The 
way in which managers balance their incentives influences managerial decision making 
and firm performance; consequently, I also examine whether managers’ compensation 
incentives affects market participants’ reaction to firm performance. 
Although analysts primarily forecast an after-tax EPS, managers’ compensation 
incentives can include any combination of pre-tax and after-tax metrics. Firms’ relative 
performance at fiscal year-end can change if managers prioritize their pre-tax 
compensation incentives over the after-tax analysts’ forecasts. Consistent with McAnally 
et al. (2008), who state that managers will miss analysts’ targets even after carefully 
considering the outcomes of doing so, managers might purposefully prioritize their 
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compensation incentives over the analysts’ earnings targets. Alternatively, managers 
might unintentionally prioritize their compensation incentives with the expectation that 
meeting their pre-tax compensation targets will also result in the firm meeting the 
analysts’ after-tax EPS forecasts. This prioritization would be in line with studies that 
conclude that even sophisticated users of financial statements are not able to utilize tax-
specific information (Plumlee, 2003; Weber, 2009). Regardless of the intentions that 
drive managers’ incentive prioritization, with my first hypothesis I examine whether the 
likelihood that managers meet their implicit after-tax EPS targets decreases when their 
explicit short-term compensation targets are based on pre-tax metrics.  
Brickley et al. (1985), De Fusco et al. (1990), and Tehranian and Wagelein 
(1985) document that market participants react positively to the adoption of long-term 
compensation plans, stock options, and bonus plans, respectively. Since managerial 
incentives affect the actions and decisions of managers (Balsam, 1998; Gaver et al., 
1995; Healy, 1985; Holthausen et al, 1995) and firm performance is a function of these 
managerial actions and decisions, I argue that managerial incentives will influence 
market participants’ reaction to firm performance. If investors believe that the firm has 
missed the analysts’ after-tax EPS target at fiscal year-end due to executives’ 
prioritization of their own incentives above the analysts’ after-tax EPS target, then the 
negative market reaction to poor firm performance might also incorporate a reaction to 
the compensation incentives that influence managerial actions and decisions. Thus, with 
my second hypothesis I examine whether the market reaction to missed after-tax 
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earnings targets will be incrementally more negative when managers’ explicit 
compensation incentives contain only pre-tax metrics.  
To investigate whether explicit pre-tax compensation incentives decrease the 
likelihood of meeting analysts’ after-tax EPS forecasts at fiscal year-end, I modify the 
research framework established by Dhaliwal et al. (2004) in their study on earnings 
management through the tax accounts. Since the firm chooses the structure of managers’ 
explicit compensation incentives, I utilize a two-stage regression approach to address 
endogeneity concerns. To examine whether market participants incorporate 
compensation-specific information into their reaction to missed analysts’ targets, I 
modify the framework established by Gleason and Mills (2008). I follow my primary 
empirical analyses with a series of additional tests in which I examine if market 
participants place greater value on meeting analysts’ EPS targets or executives’ 
compensation metrics, and whether long-run operational performance differs for firms 
that have met or missed one or both of analysts’ EPS targets and executives’ 
compensation targets. 
I find that when compensation incentives are based on pre-tax performance 
metrics, managers are less likely to meet analysts’ after-tax earnings targets. So, 
although compensation committees are decreasing their use of EPS as a compensation 
metric (Equilar, 2016), a consequence of this decrease is an increased likelihood that 
managers, unintentionally or intentionally, prioritize meeting their compensation 
incentives over analysts’ earnings targets at fiscal year-end. Furthermore, my results 
demonstrate that the negative market reaction surrounding the earnings announcements 
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of firms that miss analysts’ EPS targets are incrementally larger in instances where 
CEOs’ compensation incentives include only pre-tax performance metrics. Under such 
circumstances, investors could deem missed analysts’ forecasts to be an adverse 
outcome of compensation structure and a result of the executives acting in their own best 
interests, and not behaving consistently with the analysts’ EPS forecasts.  
Prior work on executive remuneration documents an association between short-
term incentive contracts and the accrual decisions of managers (Balsam, 1998; Gaver et 
al., 1995; Guidry et al., 1999; Healy, 1985; Holthausen et al., 1995). Research in this 
area also demonstrates an association between short-term incentive compensation and 
firm-level tax and financial outcomes (Armstrong et al., 2015; Gaertner, 2014; Phillips, 
2003; Powers et al., 2016). This study adds to the literature by demonstrating an 
association between compensation incentives and the likelihood of meeting analysts’ 
forecasts. Furthermore, the market reaction tests provide empirical evidence that market 
participants incorporate compensation specific information into their decision making 
processes when reacting to firm performance. Extant literature in accounting has 
demonstrated that market participants react to the adoption of different compensation 
plans (Brickley et al., 1985; DeFusco et al., 1990; Tehranian and Waegelein, 1985); 
however, research on investors’ reactions to firm performance surrounding analysts’ 
forecasts reveals a singular focus on whether the firm was able to meet the benchmarks 
set by analysts (Bartov et al., 2002). I add to this stream of literature by showing that 
market participants impound information regarding compensation structure into their 
firm valuation decisions.  
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The results of my study may be of interest to compensation committees, 
managers, and market participants. As they pertain to compensation committees, my 
results suggest that removing EPS as a compensation benchmark will shift managerial 
focus away from analysts’ EPS forecasts. Additionally, my results can help managers 
discern how the prioritization of different incentives might affect market participants’ 
evaluation of firm performance. Because investors value analysts’ EPS forecasts as an 
indicator of firm performance, my results can give them an insight into how incentives 
chosen by the compensation committee to improve firm performance and increase 
shareholder wealth (Murphy, 1999) might affect firm performance relative to the 
analysts’ EPS forecast. 
I organize the remainder of the paper as follows: Section II presents a brief 
overview of the relevant literature in short-term compensation and earnings 
management, and the development of the hypotheses. Section III provides the research 
design, and discusses my sample selection process. Section IV presents the descriptive 
statistics, the results of my primary analyses, as well as some additional empirical 
analyses, and section V concludes. 
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2. LITERATURE REVIEW AND HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT 
 
2.1. Compensation Incentives and Managerial Behavior 
Prior studies in accounting have demonstrated that market participants consider 
meeting or beating analysts’ EPS forecasts to be an important indicator of firm 
performance. Meeting targets set by analysts has a significant positive influence on firm 
valuation (Bartov et al., 2002; Kasznick and McNichols, 2002), and missing these 
targets is detrimental to firm value (Brown et al., 1987; Skinner and Sloan, 2002). For 
instance, Skinner and Sloan (2002) study market participants’ reaction to earnings 
announcements and conclude that the reaction to negative earnings surprises tends to be 
larger than the reaction to positive earnings surprises. Schrand and Wong (2003) 
attribute the stock price declines surrounding negative earnings surprises to investors 
reassessing expected future earnings and reevaluating firm risk. Matsumoto (2002) notes 
that missed analysts’ targets could result in negative publicity for the firm. Bartov et al. 
(2002), and Kasznick and McNichols (2002) demonstrate that firms experience positive 
returns surrounding earnings announcements in response to positive earnings surprises. 
Brown and Caylor (2005) state that meeting analysts’ targets helps firms build 
credibility in capital markets. When taken together, the positive outcomes associated 
with achieving analysts’ forecasts, and the negative consequences of missing these 
expectations provides managers with implicit incentives to meet this target. 
Managers are also influenced by explicit incentives, such as those provided by 
short-term compensation contracts (Balsam, 1998; Gaver et al., 1995; Healy, 1985; 
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Holthausen et al, 1995). Healy (1985) is the first to demonstrate that utility-maximizing 
managers select accounting procedures in order to increase the net present value of their 
annual payouts. In addition, Balsam (1998), Gaver et al. (1995), and Holthausen et al. 
(1995) demonstrate an association between managers’ short-term compensation 
incentives and their discretionary accrual choices. Using propriety data on business-unit 
manager compensation, Guidry et al. (1999) support the results of Healy (1985) by 
showing that business-unit managers will manipulate earnings to maximize their short-
term bonus plans. More recently, Gaertner (2014) and Powers et al. (2016) have 
concluded that managers’ short-term compensation influences firms’ financial reporting 
and tax outcomes. In summary, the implicit incentives provided by analysts’ EPS 
forecasts and the explicit incentives provided by annual compensation contracts 
influence managerial decision making and affect firm performance. 
Compensation committees design short-term managerial incentives in order to 
improve firm performance and increase shareholder wealth (Murphy, 1999). So, 
although analysts primarily forecast an after-tax EPS, managers’ annual compensation 
incentives can include any combination of pre-tax and after-tax metrics. For instance, the 
2017 proxy statement for Apple Inc. states that net sales and operating income are the 
compensation metrics for all executives’ annual cash incentives. As a result, the tax 
status of Apple’s compensation incentives differs from analysts’ after-tax EPS forecasts, 
as both net sales and operating income are pre-tax metrics. Due to the complexities of 
the tax code, not all items on a firms’ books are subject to the same tax treatment; 
additionally, firms operate in multiple domestic or international tax jurisdictions. So, an 
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increase in pre-tax earnings might not necessarily correspond to an increase in after-tax 
earnings. Therefore, when multiple incentives that are not of the same tax status 
influence managerial behavior, it is possible for firms’ end-of-year performance to 
change depending on how managers prioritize these various incentives. 
There are many reasons why managers facing multiple incentives may prioritize 
operating decisions in order to meet their annual payouts, as opposed to analysts’ EPS 
forecasts, at fiscal year-end. One such reason comes from studies examining the 
complexity of tax-specific information. Plumlee (2003), who looks at how analysts’ 
utilize tax-specific information following the Tax Reform Act of 1986, determines that 
analysts’ revisions of their effective tax rate (ETR) forecasts incorporate the less 
complex aspects of tax information and ignore the more complex aspects. Plumlee’s 
results demonstrate that the complexity of tax-specific information imposes costs even 
on sophisticated users of financial information. Weber (2009) focuses on the information 
contained in book-tax differences and concludes that analysts and investors do not 
incorporate this information into earnings forecasts and firm valuation decisions. Finally, 
Dhaliwal et al. (2004) state that the tax expense is difficult to estimate due to the amount 
of complex information that needs to be included into the estimation. So, it could be 
possible that managers miss analysts’ targets at fiscal year-end because they do not 
completely incorporate the complex information pertaining to taxes, and prioritize their 
short-term compensation incentives with the expectation that meeting their pre-tax 
compensation targets will also result in the firm meeting the after-tax analysts’ 
expectation at fiscal year-end. 
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Another reason why managers might prioritize their explicit compensation 
incentives over the incentives provided by analysts’ EPS forecasts comes from studies 
that present evidence in line with executives taking actions aimed at maximizing payouts 
at the expense of firm value. Burns and Kedia (2006), Efendi et al. (2007), and 
McAnally et al. (2008) all demonstrate that when presented with certain incentive 
structures, CEOs make decisions that increase their own personal wealth, even if the 
outcomes of those decisions decrease shareholder welfare and harm firm valuation. In 
fact McAnally et al. (2008) argue that executives carefully weigh the outcomes of 
missing analysts’ targets before choosing to miss the target at fiscal year-end in order to 
get a lower strike price on subsequent option grants. Therefore, it might be the case that 
managers prioritize their pre-tax compensation incentives even though they know that 
this could lead to missed after-tax analysts’ targets at fiscal year-end. Based on the above 
discussion, I argue that when managers’ explicit short-term compensation incentives 
contain only pre-tax performance metrics, they will be less likely to meet their after-tax 
implicit incentives. More specifically, I hypothesize that managers whose annual 
compensation contracts include only pre-tax metrics will be less likely to meet analysts’ 
after-tax EPS targets at fiscal year-end. Accordingly, I state my first hypothesis as 
follows:  
H1: Managers whose explicit short-term compensation incentives are based on pre-
tax metrics will be less likely to meet their implicit after-tax earnings incentives, 
ceteris paribus. 
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There are a few reasons why the hypothesized relation between short-term 
compensation incentives and analysts’ after-tax earnings targets might not exist; the 
most compelling argument is that managerial compensation arrangements generally 
include long-term forms of compensation in order to curb the myopia brought about by 
any short-term compensation incentives. Studies on executive compensation conclude 
that compensation contracts should contain both short-term and long-term incentives in 
order to mitigate over- or under-investment in the short- or the long-run. For instance, 
Dechow and Sloan (1991) note that the inclusion of both long-term and short-term 
performance measures in executive compensation plans indicates that neither measure 
alone is optimal, and that each measure has its own set of costs and benefits. Similarly, 
in an analytical study on compensation form and managerial decision horizons, 
Narayanan (1996) shows that contracts consisting of both long-term and short-term 
forms of compensation produce efficient investment. In line with these findings, it might 
be the case that the incentives provided by any long-term forms of compensation 
mitigate the influence of short-term compensation incentives on managerial decision 
making. 
Another argument relates to the negative consequences that could potentially 
affect executives as a result of missing consensus analysts’ EPS expectations. In addition 
to the numerous studies that link firm-specific outcomes with missed analysts’ forecasts, 
there are a number of studies that document manager-specific outcomes that result from 
missed analysts’ targets. For instance, Matsunaga and Park (2001) examine the effects of 
missing quarterly earnings benchmarks and demonstrate that compensation committees 
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exact penalties on executives when quarterly earnings fall short of analysts’ 
expectations. The authors point to the removal of Dial Corporation’s CEO as an extreme 
case where the CEO’s termination was a direct result of missed analysts’ targets. The 
potential loss in managerial wealth, and negative job market consequences stemming 
from missing analysts’ expectations might create additional incentives for managers to 
meet or beat the analysts’ after-tax earnings targets, regardless of the pre-tax incentives 
provided by managers’ short-term compensation arrangements. 
2.2. Compensation Incentives and the Market Reaction to Firm Performance 
Extant research has documented that market participants impound compensation-
specific information into their decision making processes. Studies examining executive 
remuneration have demonstrated that investors react positively following news of the 
adoption of both short-term and long-term compensation arrangements. Tehranian and 
Waegelein (1985) find a positive reaction following the adoption of bonus plans, 
whereas Brickley et al. (1985) and DeFusco et al. (1990) find a similar reaction 
following the adoption of long-term managerial compensation packages and stock 
options, respectively. Given that market participants incorporate compensation specific 
information into their decision making processes, I conjecture that the market reaction to 
missed after-tax earnings targets will be incrementally more negative when managers’ 
explicit short-term compensation incentives contain only pre-tax performance metrics. 
Because short-term compensation incentives influence managerial actions and decisions 
(Healy, 1985; Holthausen et al., 1995; Gaver et al., 1995; Balsam, 1998; Guidry et al., 
1999; Gaertner, 2014; Powers et al., 2016) and firm performance is a function of these 
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managerial actions and decisions, investors could view managerial compensation 
incentives as one potential reason for poor firm performance. If investors believe that the 
firm has missed the analysts’ after-tax EPS target at fiscal year-end due to executives’ 
prioritization of their own incentives above the analysts’ after-tax EPS target, then the 
negative market reaction to poor firm performance might also incorporate a reaction to 
the compensation incentives that influence managerial actions and decisions. 
Accordingly, I state my second hypothesis as follows: 
H2: The market reaction to missed after-tax earnings targets will be incrementally 
more negative when managers’ explicit short-term compensation incentives are 
based on pre-tax metrics, ceteris paribus. 
One argument against this hypothesis relates to whether market participants 
incorporate information regarding short-term compensation incentives into their decision 
making processes. A large body of research concludes that market participants do not 
incorporate all available information when making judgements regarding firm value and 
operations. For instance, Hirshleifer et al. (2004) demonstrate that investors do not fully 
utilize information presented in the balance sheet, even though this information is useful 
for evaluating the financial performance of the firm. Shi and Zhang (2013) present 
empirical evidence to support the notion that investors fixate on earnings figures when 
valuing firm performance. Kim et al. (2015), Plumlee (2003), and Weber (2009) find 
that market participants are unable to incorporate complex information into their 
decision making processes. If investors fixate only on whether firms meet analysts’ EPS 
targets at fiscal year-end, or if investors deem information regarding short-term 
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compensation incentives to be too complex, then the composition of short-term 
compensation incentives might not have an incremental effect on the market reaction to 
missed targets.
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3. RESEARCH DESIGN 
 
3.1. Sample Selection 
My sample consists of observations at the intersection of the Compustat Annual, 
Compustat Quarterly, I/B/E/S, Execucomp, CRSP, BoardEx and IncentiveLab databases 
for the years 2006 to 2017. I obtain data on the ratio of CEO bonus pay to overall current 
remuneration from Execucomp, annual incentive plan (AIP) compensation metrics from 
IncentiveLab, analyst forecast data from I/B/E/S, stock return data required to calculate 
cumulative abnormal returns from CRSP, general firm financial data from Compustat 
Annual and Compustat Quarterly, and data required for the governance variables from 
BoardEx. 
My sample period is limited by the disclosure requirements surrounding 
executive compensation. In 2006 the SEC enhanced existing rules by requiring the 
inclusion of a compensation discussion and analysis section in publicly available 
disclosures. IncentiveLab aggregates the data available in these public disclosures for 
S&P 500 and S&P 400 companies, therefore the earliest observations on AIP 
compensation metrics are from 2006. I further limit my sample by removing firms with 
assets of less than $10 million, in order to limit the influence of smaller firms on any 
empirical associations. I remove firm-year observations with missing data required to 
construct the AIP compensation measure, as well as observations with missing control 
variables. Finally, I remove industry classifications without enough observations to run 
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the required empirical analyses. The final sample consists of 6,688 observations from 
2006 to 2017.1 Table 1 provides details regarding the sample selection procedure. 
 
TABLE 1 
Sample Construction 
Sample Criteria 
Firm - 
Years 
Merger of Compustat Annual, Compustat Quarterly, CRSP, I/B/E/S, 
Execucomp, RiskMetrics, and IncentiveLab 133,657 
     Remove observations before 2006 -59,493 
     Remove observations with less than $10 million in assets -19,815 
     Remove observations with missing short-term compensation variables -45,168 
     Remove observations with missing control variables -2,464 
     Remove SIC2 industry classifications without enough observations to 
run empirical analyses -29 
Final Sample 6,688 
Subsample of firms that would have missed analysts' forecasts with their 
3rd quarter ETRs (i.e. MISS = 1) 3,658 
Notes: The Appendix provides definitions for variables used in analyses. 
 
 
3.2. Annual Incentive Plans (AIPs) 
Compensation committees design annual incentive plans (AIPs) to improve 
short-term performance (Murphy, 1999). A look at the universe of firms on the 
Execucomp database from 2006, when the SEC mandated more detailed disclosures on 
executive compensation, to 2016 reveals that 23 percent of all CEO compensation 
                                                 
1 For the analyses in which I look at the likelihood of meeting or beating analysts’ earnings forecasts using 
tax account manipulations, I further my limit my sample to 3,658 firm-year observations that would have 
missed analysts’ forecasts with their 3rd quarter effective tax rates (i.e. firm-year observations for which 
MISS = 1). 
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contracts incorporate an annual bonus. Among these firms, the bonus accounts for a 
nontrivial amount of both total CEO compensation and current CEO compensation, on 
average contributing to 19.8 percent and 40.8 percent of payouts, respectively. It then 
naturally follows that executives would make accounting decisions aimed at achieving 
the performance metrics laid out in their bonus (Healy, 1985). Within the framework of 
this study, I utilize AIPs as a proxy for the explicit short-term compensation incentives 
that motivate managerial behavior. 
AIPs are composed of various accounting and non-accounting metrics aimed at 
achieving firms’ strategic and operational goals; I only focus on the accounting metrics. 
The IncentiveLab database classifies these metrics as cash flow, earnings, EBIT, 
EBITDA, EBT, EPS, EVA, FFO, operating income, profit margin, ROA, ROE, ROI, 
ROIC, sales, vague, or other. I drop vague and other, and categorize the remaining 
targets as being either after-tax, or pre-tax.2 I expect that when managers’ AIPs are 
composed solely of pre-tax metrics they will be less likely to meet analysts’ after-tax 
EPS expectations. 
3.3. Earnings Management through the Tax Accounts 
Extant studies in earnings management have documented a number of tools 
utilized by firms in managing earnings in order to meet analysts’ EPS targets at fiscal 
year-end. Changes to pension plan assumptions (An et al., 2014), reversals to 
                                                 
2 To verify whether targets are calculated on an after-tax, or a pre-tax basis, I utilize Python to scrape the 
compensation discussion and analysis section of the proxy statements. I then classify CEO-year 
observations with only pre-tax targets as having pre-tax incentives, and CEO-year observations with only 
after-tax targets or a combination of both pre-tax and after-tax targets as having after-tax incentives. 
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restructuring charges (Moehrle, 2002), and the manipulation of real activities 
(Roychowdhury, 2006) are just some of the mechanisms available for earnings 
management purposes. Following Dhaliwal et al. (2004), who establish the tax expense 
account as a “last chance” mechanism to manage earnings and meet analysts’ 
expectations when all other avenues of earnings management have been exhausted, I 
utilize earnings management through the tax accounts as the setting with which I test my 
research questions.3 
I focus specifically on firms’ ability to manage earnings through the income tax 
expense for a number of reasons. First, tax expense provides a large base from which to 
manage earnings and the income tax expense is universal, as a broad set of firms are 
burdened with taxes. Therefore, managing earnings through the income tax expense 
might be an option for a large number of firms, whereas other popular earnings 
management mechanisms might only be available for a smaller subset of firms. Second, 
Dhaliwal et al. (2004) state that there must be a certain level of information asymmetry 
between managers and shareholders in order for earnings management to take place. The 
combination of the complexity of tax rules and the managerial discretion in estimating 
tax expense accounts ensures the persistence of such information asymmetry. Third, 
focusing on earnings management through the tax accounts affords me the opportunity 
to more clearly identify firms that have actually managed their earnings in order to meet 
                                                 
3 The literature has established the valuation allowance for deferred tax assets (Bauman et al., 2001; Frank 
and Rego, 2006; Miller and Skinner, 1998; Schrand and Wong, 2003), the taxes on permanently reinvested 
foreign earnings (Krull, 2004), and the reserve for uncertain tax benefits (Blouin et al., 2010; Cazier et al., 
2015; Gupta et al., 2015) as the main mechanisms through which firms can manage earnings using the 
income tax expense. 
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analysts’ earnings targets at fiscal year-end. ASC 740-10 requires that firms estimate 
their ETR expected to be applicable for the full fiscal year in their quarterly reports. 
Since ASC 740-10 states that firms should make their best estimate of their fiscal year-
end ETR, firms’ estimate of their ETR at the third quarter provides a good proxy for 
their unmanaged ETR. If a firms’ third quarter ETR estimate is greater than its actual 
fiscal year-end ETR, and the firm has met the analysts’ EPS target through this ETR 
decrease, then the firm has managed earnings through the tax expense in order to meet 
analysts’ targets. 
Finally, using earnings management through the tax accounts as my setting 
allows me to focus on situations in which firms are at risk of missing analysts’ consensus 
forecasts with their third quarter effective tax rates, and managerial action is required at 
fiscal year-end in order to decrease the tax rate and meet analysts’ EPS targets at fiscal 
year-end. Most AIP metrics are based on either post-tax numbers, pre-tax numbers, or a 
combination of the two. I propose that this categorization allows for a distinction 
between AIPs that would increase the likelihood that CEOs resort to tax expense 
manipulations, and AIPs that do not increase the likelihood of such manipulations. AIPs 
that include only after-tax performance metrics, or a combination of pre-tax and after-tax 
measures might cause managers to prioritize the implicit incentives provided by 
analysts’ after-tax earnings targets, as any decreases in tax expense would increase after-
tax numbers and would lead not only to firms meeting the analysts’ forecasted EPS at 
fiscal year-end, but also to managers’ achieving the metrics required for their bonus 
payouts. 
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3.4. Testing Compensation Incentives and Managerial Behavior (H1) 
With my first hypothesis, I investigate whether managers whose annual 
compensation contracts include only pre-tax metrics will be less likely to manage 
earnings in order to meet analysts’ after-tax EPS targets at fiscal year-end. I focus on 
instances where the firm is at risk of missing analysts’ consensus forecasts with third 
quarter effective tax rates, and additional managerial action is required to achieve 
analysts’ targets at fiscal year-end. I empirically test this relation by looking at whether 
the likelihood of using tax expense accounts to manage earnings decreases in firms 
where the CEO’s AIP is composed of only pre-tax metrics. I slightly modify the 
methodology employed by Dhaliwal et al. (2004) as follows: 
(1) Pr(MBWTAX = 1)i,t = β0 + β1PT_AIPi,t + β2-4CONTROLSk,t + β YEAR FE + β 
INDUSTRY FE 
The dependent variable, MBWTAX, is an indicator variable that equals one for firms that 
achieved the consensus forecasted EPS by managing earnings through the tax expense. 
Specifically, I assign a value of one to firm-year observations for which the earnings 
target would have been missed with the third quarter effective tax rate, but was met at 
the fiscal year-end. PT_AIP is an indicator variable that equals one for firm-year 
observations for which the CEOs AIP is composed of only metrics that are classified as 
being pre-tax. CONTROLS is a vector of control variables utilized by Dhaliwal et al. 
(2004) as part of their empirical analyses; it includes TAX_OWED, ETRQ3, and 
ACCRUALS. The first of these controls, TAX_OWED is a control for the extent of over- 
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or under-payment of estimated taxes, ETRQ3 is the third quarter effective tax rate, and 
ACCRUALS is total accruals scaled by pre-tax book income. 
I argue that managers whose explicit compensation incentives include only pre-tax 
performance metrics will be less likely to meet analysts’ after-tax EPS targets at fiscal 
year-end. I operationalize this hypothesis by examining whether firms that use only pre-
tax metrics for the CEO’s AIP are less likely to use the tax expense account to manage 
earnings towards the consensus analysts’ EPS forecast. In accordance with this 
prediction, I expect that the coefficient on β1 will be negative. 
3.5. Testing Compensation Incentives and the Market Reaction to Firm 
Performance (H2) 
Building on the work of Dhaliwal et al. (2004), Gleason and Mills (2008) 
examine whether the market responses differ for firms that use tax expense decreases to 
beat analysts’ forecasted earnings targets. Gleason and Mills (2008) exploit accounting 
standards that force firms to provide a quarterly estimate of the effective tax rate that is 
expected to be applicable for the full fiscal year, and demonstrate that market 
participants are able to use any decreases in effective tax rates from the third quarter to 
the fourth quarter to make a judgement regarding pre-managed earnings and the overall 
persistence of earnings. In my second hypothesis I modify the Gleason and Mills (2008) 
framework to investigate whether market participants impound compensation specific 
information into their decision processes when reacting to firm performance. I 
empirically test this relation by investigating whether the three-day cumulative abnormal 
returns surrounding earnings announcements is more negative for firms that missed 
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analysts’ expectations, when executives’ AIPs contain only pre-tax metrics. I use the 
following model: 
(2) ANNCARi,t = β0 + β1PT_AIPi,t + β2MISS TARGETi,t + β3PT_AIP x MISS TARGET + 
β4-8CONTROLSk,t + β YEAR FE + β INDUSTRY FE + ei,t 
Consistent with Gleason and Mills (2008), I define the dependent variable as the three-
day cumulative abnormal returns that surround the earnings announcement. PT_AIP is 
defined in Equation (1), and is my main variable of interest. MISS_TARGET is an 
indicator variable that equals one for firms that missed analysts’ forecasted earnings by 
fiscal year-end, and zero otherwise. CONTROLS is a vector of control variables utilized 
by Gleason and Mills (2008) as part of their empirical analyses; it includes AFE, BM, 
SIZE, MOMENTUM, and PERSISTENCE. PERSISTENCE controls for the persistence of 
quarterly tax changes. BM, SIZE and MOMENTUM are included in order to control for 
variables that have been shown to be related to returns by capital market studies, and 
represent the book-to-market ratio (BM), the natural log of total assets (SIZE), and the 
cumulative size-adjusted returns for the six-months preceding the earnings 
announcement (MOMENTUM), respectively. Finally, AFE is the analysts’ forecast error, 
and is measured as the actual earnings reported by I/B/E/S minus the expected earnings 
from the last consensus forecast prior to the earnings announcement. 
For my second hypothesis, I argue that the market reaction surrounding the 
earnings announcements of firms that have missed analysts’ forecasted earnings will be 
incrementally more negative in cases where short-term compensation incentives are 
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based only on pre-tax performance metrics. In accordance with this prediction, I expect 
that the coefficient on β3 will be negative. 
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4. RESULTS 
 
4.1. Descriptive Statistics and Correlation Coefficients 
Table 2 Panel A presents the descriptive statistics for my full sample of 6,688 
firm-year observations. Even with differences in the sample sizes and sample selection 
procedures, the means and medians of my control variables are comparable with prior 
research (Dhaliwal et al., 2004; Gleason and Mills, 2008). The mean value of MBWTAX 
is 0.363, indicating that around 36 percent of firm-year observations manage tax 
accounts in order to meet analysts’ forecasted EPS targets at fiscal year-end. The mean 
value of MISS is 0.547, meaning that 55 percent of firm-year observations are at risk of 
missing analysts’ targets given their 3rd quarter ETRs. MB has a mean value of 0.720, 
which implies that only around 72 percent of firm-year observations are able to meet 
analysts’ EPS targets at fiscal year-end; this result demonstrates that in spite of the 
negative consequences associated with missing analysts’ forecasted EPS, a significant 
portion of firms are unable to achieve this target at fiscal year-end. Finally, PT_AIP has 
a mean value of 0.355, which means that around 36 percent of the firm-year 
observations in my sample have AIPs that are composed strictly of pre-tax accounting 
metrics. 
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TABLE 2 
Panel A 
Descriptive Statistics 
Variable N Mean Std Dev Q1 Median Q3 
MBWTAX 6,688 0.363 0.481 0.000 0.000 1.000 
ANNCAR 6,688 0.004 0.068 -0.030 0.003 0.038 
PT_AIP 6,688 0.355 0.479 0.000 0.000 1.000 
MISS 6,688 0.547 0.498 0.000 1.000 1.000 
MB 6,688 0.720 0.449 0.000 1.000 1.000 
TAXOWED 6,688 0.045 0.210 0.000 0.007 0.074 
ETR3 6,688 0.266 0.250 0.216 0.312 0.365 
ACCRUALS 6,688 -0.551 10.920 -0.876 -0.382 -0.078 
AFE 6,688 -0.001 0.018 -0.002 0.000 0.002 
BTM 6,688 0.472 0.401 0.235 0.387 0.618 
SIZE 6,688 8.712 1.329 7.779 8.592 9.598 
MOMENTUM 6,688 0.003 0.061 -0.023 0.003 0.030 
PERSISTENCE 6,688 0.711 16.771 -2.385 0.133 3.086 
Notes: All continuous variables are winsorized at 1% and 99%. 
 
 
Table 2 Panel B presents the descriptive statistics for 3,658 firm-year 
observations that would have missed analysts’ forecasts given their third quarter ETRs 
(i.e. firms for which MISS = 1). For these observations, the mean value of MBWTAX is 
0.665, indicating that 67 percent of firm-year observations decrease their ETRs from the 
third quarter to the fourth quarter in order to meet analysts’ forecasted EPS targets. The 
remaining 33 percent of firm-year observations are either unable or unwilling to manage 
their tax accounts, and miss earnings targets at fiscal year-end. 
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TABLE 2 CONTINUED 
Panel B 
Descriptive Statistics for a Subsample of MISS = 1 Firm-Year Observations 
Variable N Mean Std Dev Q1 Median Q3 
MBWTAX 3,658 0.665 0.472 0.000 1.000 1.000 
ANNCAR 3,658 -0.002 0.074 -0.038 -0.002 0.036 
PT_AIP 3,658 0.378 0.485 0.000 0.000 1.000 
MB 3,658 0.665 0.472 0.000 1.000 1.000 
TAXOWED 3,658 0.046 0.251 0.000 0.003 0.081 
ETR3 3,658 0.258 0.264 0.186 0.303 0.365 
ACCRUALS 3,658 -0.603 13.835 -1.081 -0.461 -0.046 
AFE 3,658 -0.002 0.021 -0.001 0.000 0.002 
BTM 3,658 0.501 0.431 0.247 0.414 0.659 
SIZE 3,658 8.700 1.347 7.771 8.559 9.602 
MOMENTUM 3,658 0.001 0.064 -0.026 0.001 0.030 
PERSISTENCE 3,658 0.577 16.315 -2.250 0.109 2.765 
Notes: All continuous variables are winsorized at 1% and 99%. The sample is comprised of 3,658 firm-
year observations that would have missed analysts’ forecasts given their third quarter ETR (i.e., MISS = 
1). 
 
 
Table 3 presents the Pearson and Spearman correlation coefficients for the 
variables used in the empirical analyses; Panel A displays statistics for the full sample of 
6,688 firm-year observations, Panel B displays statistics for the 3,658 observations that 
would have missed analysts’ forecasted EPS targets given their 3rd quarter ETR 
predictions (i.e. observations for which MISS = 1). In Table 3 Panel A, the significantly 
negative correlation between PT_AIP and MB indicates a negative association between 
having AIPs with only pre-tax accounting metrics and meeting analysts’ forecasted EPS 
targets at fiscal year-end. Also of note is the significantly negative correlation between 
PT_AIP and MBWTAX in Table 3 Panel B, which provides univariate support for 
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hypothesis 1 and suggests that in instances where managerial action is required at fiscal 
year-end in order to meet analysts’ expectations (i.e. when firms are at risk of missing 
the analysts’ forecasted EPS targets with their 3rd quarter ETRs), short-term 
compensation arrangements with pre-tax performance metrics are associated with a 
decrease in the likelihood that firms meet analysts’ expectations. 
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TABLE 3 
Panel A 
Correlations  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) 
(1) MBWTAX 
 
0.075 0.010 0.688 0.471 0.017 -0.022 -0.026 0.135 0.013 -0.016 -0.008 -0.014 
(2) ANNCAR 0.077 
 
0.002 -0.093 0.222 0.005 -0.004 -0.002 0.111 0.004 -0.047 -0.019 0.017 
(3) PT_AIP 0.010 0.015 
 
0.052 -0.049 -0.022 -0.034 0.027 -0.020 -0.002 -0.130 0.003 -0.001 
(4) MISS 0.688 -0.098 0.052 
 
-0.137 0.007 -0.034 -0.005 -0.064 0.081 -0.009 -0.033 -0.009 
(5) MB 0.471 0.239 -0.049 -0.137 
 
0.020 0.004 -0.023 0.266 -0.077 -0.036 0.028 -0.018 
(6) TAXOWED 0.018 0.020 -0.068 -0.022 0.054 
 
0.029 -0.169 0.039 -0.014 0.031 0.010 0.007 
(7) ETR3 -0.066 -0.002 0.025 -0.063 -0.018 0.042 
 
-0.048 -0.009 -0.033 0.043 0.030 0.000 
(8) ACCRUALS -0.094 -0.010 0.068 -0.089 -0.032 -0.175 -0.086 
 
-0.034 0.016 -0.007 -0.025 0.012 
(9) AFE 0.327 0.296 0.007 -0.107 0.684 0.007 -0.044 -0.022 
 
-0.109 -0.011 0.046 -0.025 
(10) BTM 0.024 -0.020 -0.031 0.084 -0.072 -0.033 -0.009 -0.071 0.091 
 
0.156 0.009 0.016 
(11) SIZE -0.014 -0.047 -0.133 -0.008 -0.035 0.053 -0.018 -0.107 -0.057 0.169 
 
-0.005 0.007 
(12) MOMENTUM -0.006 -0.021 -0.005 -0.042 0.040 0.020 0.021 -0.017 0.032 -0.002 -0.016 
 
-0.010 
(13) 
PERSISTENCE 
-0.013 0.000 0.001 -0.012 -0.001 -0.002 0.017 -0.004 -0.016 -0.027 -0.003 0.005 
 
Notes: Table 3 presents both Pearson (above the diagonal) and Spearman (below the diagonal) correlations among variables. All continuous variables are 
winsorized at the 1% and 99% levels. Correlations in bold are statistically significant at least at the 10% level. 
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TABLE 3 CONTINUED 
Panel B 
Correlations for a Subsample of MISS = 1 Firm-Year Observations  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
(1) MBWTAX 
 
0.239 -0.047 1.000 0.018 0.002 -0.034 0.290 -0.073 -0.017 0.026 -0.016 
(2) ANNCAR 0.263 
 
-0.027 0.239 0.005 -0.018 0.004 0.103 0.022 -0.026 -0.009 0.004 
(3) PT_AIP -0.047 -0.010 
 
-0.047 -0.012 -0.044 0.044 -0.024 -0.005 -0.145 0.012 0.006 
(4) MB 1.000 0.263 -0.047 
 
0.018 0.002 -0.034 0.290 -0.073 -0.017 0.026 -0.016 
(5) TAXOWED 0.058 0.034 -0.056 0.058 
 
0.071 -0.190 0.035 -0.028 0.007 0.006 0.012 
(6) ETR3 -0.035 -0.034 -0.005 -0.035 0.064 
 
-0.054 0.029 -0.015 0.081 0.027 0.006 
(7) ACCRUALS -0.044 -0.010 0.074 -0.044 -0.246 -0.138 
 
-0.033 0.017 -0.009 -0.018 0.013 
(8) AFE 0.724 0.301 0.001 0.724 0.020 -0.035 -0.030 
 
-0.140 -0.015 0.048 -0.048 
(9) BTM -0.066 -0.023 -0.034 -0.066 -0.035 0.014 -0.018 0.036 
 
0.113 0.009 0.021 
(10) SIZE -0.016 -0.015 -0.144 -0.016 0.063 0.043 -0.108 -0.068 0.119 
 
-0.012 0.024 
(11) MOMENTUM 0.043 -0.013 0.010 0.043 0.019 0.015 -0.047 0.028 -0.008 -0.022 
 
-0.013 
(12) PERSISTENCE -0.007 -0.016 0.022 -0.007 0.004 -0.005 -0.002 -0.010 -0.024 0.010 0.006 
 
Notes: Table 3 Panel B presents both Pearson (above the diagonal) and Spearman (below the diagonal) correlations among variables. All continuous variables 
are winsorized at the 1% and 99% levels. The sample is comprised of 3,658 firm-year observations that would have missed analysts’ forecasts given their third 
quarter ETR (i.e., MISS = 1). Correlations in bold are statistically significant at least at the 10% level. 
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4.2. Multivariate Analyses 
4.2.1. AIP Structure and Earnings Management through Tax Accounts (H1) 
With my first hypothesis I argue that pre-tax short-term compensation incentives 
reduce the likelihood that firms will meet analysts’ after-tax earnings targets at fiscal 
year-end. Even though tax account manipulations is the mechanism through which I 
examine my research question, I examine a broader set of firms in Table 4 and provide 
preliminary empirical support to a potential problem stemming from the structure of 
executives’ compensation incentives. 
 
TABLE 4 
Panel A 
Mean Values of the MB Variable Across PT_AIP Subsamples 
  PT_AIP = 1 PT_AIP = 0 
MB 
0.691 0.737 
(2,374) (4,314) 
   
Panel B 
Differences in the Mean Values of the MB Variable Across PT_AIP Subsamples 
 t Values 
MB 3.95*** 
Notes: Table 4 Panel A presents the mean values of the MB variable across firms in which the annual 
bonus components of executive pay are composed strictly of pre-tax accounting metrics and firms in 
which the annual bonus components of executive pay are composed of after-tax metrics, or a mixture of 
pre-tax and after-tax metrics. Table 4 Panel B presents a test of the differences in the means of the MB 
variable across firms in which the annual bonus components of executive pay are composed strictly of 
pre-tax accounting metrics and firms in which the annual bonus components of executive pay are 
composed of after-tax metrics, or a mixture of pre-tax and after-tax metrics. *, **, and *** indicates 
statistical significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively. 
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TABLE 4 CONTINUED 
Panel C 
Logistic Analyses of Meeting/Beating Earnings Forecasts  
Variable Estimate (p-value) 
    
INTERCEPT -0.129 
 (0.262) 
PT_AIP -0.203*** 
 (0.006) 
TAX OWED 0.039 
 (0.192) 
ETR Q3 0.005 
 (0.875) 
ACCRUALS -0.057* 
 (0.065) 
  
Industry Dummies YES 
Year Dummies YES 
Observations 6,688 
Pseudo R2 0.041 
Notes: Table 4 Panel C presents the results of estimating a modified version of Equation (1) and 
compares the likelihood of meeting or beating analysts' forecasts for firms in which the annual bonus 
components of executive pay are composed strictly of pre-tax accounting metrics against firms in which 
the annual bonus components of executive pay are composed of after-tax metrics, or a mixture of pre-
tax and after-tax metrics. 
 
 
In Table 4 Panel A I present the mean value of the MB variable across firm-year 
observations where the annual bonus components of executive pay are composed strictly 
of after-tax metrics (i.e. PT_AIP = 1), or a mixture of pre-tax and after-tax metrics (i.e. 
PT_AIP = 0). In Panel B, I test the differences in these mean values and demonstrate that 
firms in which the AIP is composed of pre-tax metrics are significantly less likely to 
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meet analysts’ earnings targets at fiscal year-end when compared to firms in which the 
AIP is composed of a mixture of pre-tax and after-tax metrics. 
Table 4 Panel C reports the results of a modified version of Equation (1) where 
the dependent variable (MB) is an indicator that equals one for firms that achieved the 
consensus forecasted EPS at fiscal year-end. The negative and significant coefficient on 
PT_AIP indicates that CEOs with AIPs that are composed only of pre-tax accounting 
metrics are less likely to meet analysts’ earnings targets at fiscal year-end when 
compared to CEOs with AIPs that incorporate only after-tax accounting metrics, or a 
combination of both pre- and post-tax accounting metrics. The coefficient of -0.203 
implies that the odds of meeting or beating the analysts’ EPS target at fiscal year-end 
decreases by about 18.37 percent for firms that have AIPs that are composed of only pre-
tax accounting metrics. The results of the analyses in Table 4 provide preliminary 
empirical support to a potential problem stemming from the structure of executives’ 
compensation incentives in a broader setting. 
With the next set of empirical tests I focus on firms that are at risk of missing 
analysts’ earnings forecasts with their 3rd quarter ETR projections and must use tax 
account manipulations in order to meet this target at fiscal year-end. Table 5 Panel A 
presents the mean value of the MBWTAX variable across firm-year observations where 
the annual bonus components of executive pay are composed strictly of after-tax metrics 
(i.e. PT_AIP = 1), or a mixture of pre-tax and after-tax metrics (i.e. PT_AIP = 0). In 
Panel B, I test the differences in these mean values and demonstrate that firms in which 
the AIP is composed of pre-tax metrics are significantly less likely to manipulate tax 
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accounts in order to meet analysts’ earnings targets at fiscal year-end when compared to 
firms in which the AIP is composed of a mixture of pre-tax and after-tax metrics, even 
when missing the analysts’ forecasted earnings targets is certain without tax account 
manipulations. 
 
TABLE 5 
Panel A 
Mean Values of the MBWTAX Variable Across PT_AIP Subsamples 
  PT_AIP = 1 PT_AIP = 0 
MBWTAX 
0.636 0.682 
(1,382) (2,276) 
   
Panel B 
Differences in the Mean Values of the MBWTAX Variable Across PT_AIP 
Subsamples 
 t Value 
MBWTAX 2.85*** 
Notes: Table 5 Panel A presents the mean values of the MBWTAX variable across firms in which the 
annual bonus components of executive pay are composed strictly of pre-tax accounting metrics and 
firms in which the annual bonus components of executive pay are composed of after-tax metrics, or a 
mixture of pre-tax and after-tax metrics. Table 5 Panel B presents a test of the differences in the means 
of the MBWTAX variable across firms in which the annual bonus components of executive pay are 
composed strictly of pre-tax accounting metrics and firms in which the annual bonus components of 
executive pay are composed of after-tax metrics, or a mixture of pre-tax and after-tax metrics. The 
analyses are run on 3,658 firm-year observations that would have missed analysts' forecasts given their 
third quarter ETR (i.e., MISS = 1). *, **, and *** indicates statistical significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 
0.01 levels, respectively. 
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TABLE 5 CONTINUED 
Panel C 
Logistic Analyses of Meeting/Beating Earnings Forecasts Using Tax Account 
Manipulations 
Variable 
Estimate  
(p-value) 
    
INTERCEPT -0.786*** 
 (0.000) 
PT_AIP -0.222** 
 (0.021) 
TAX OWED 0.025 
 (0.454) 
ETR Q3 0.027 
 (0.467) 
ACCRUALS -0.068** 
 (0.039) 
  
Industry Dummies YES 
Year Dummies YES 
Observations 3,658 
Pseudo R2 0.068 
Notes: Table 5 Panel C presents the results of estimating Equation (1) and compares the likelihood of 
using tax account manipulations to meet or beat analysts' forecasts for firms in which the annual bonus 
components of executive pay are composed strictly of pre-tax accounting metrics against firms in which 
the annual bonus components of executive pay are composed of after-tax metrics, or a mixture of pre-
tax and after-tax metrics. The analyses are run on 3,658 firm-year observations that would have missed 
analysts' forecasts given their third quarter ETR (i.e., MISS = 1).  
 
 
Table 5 Panel C reports the results from estimating Equation (1). The dependent 
variable (MBWTAX) is an indicator variable that equals one for firms that met analysts’ 
consensus EPS targets through earnings management via the tax accounts. The 
coefficient of PT_AIP is negative and significant, which indicates that among a 
subsample of observations that would have missed the forecasted EPS value with their 
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3rd quarter ETRs (i.e. MISS = 1), those observations with AIPs composed only of pre-tax 
accounting metrics are less likely to meet analysts’ earnings targets at fiscal year-end, 
even in instances where missing the forecasted EPS is a virtual certainty. The coefficient 
of -0.222 implies that the odds of manipulating the tax accounts in order to meet or beat 
the analysts’ EPS target at fiscal year-end decreases by about 19.91 percent for firms that 
have AIPs that are composed of only pre-tax accounting metrics. Taken together with 
the univariate results, Table 4 Panel C and Table 5 Panel C provide results consistent 
with my first hypothesis. I demonstrate that when short-term compensation incentives 
include only pre-tax performance metrics, managers will be less likely to meet analysts’ 
after-tax earnings targets.4 So, although EPS as an AIP metric has been steadily 
decreasing, a consequence of this decrease is an increased likelihood that firms will miss 
analysts’ earnings targets at fiscal year-end in situations where the CEO’s AIP metrics 
differ from analysts’ EPS target. 
I argue that the results that I document in Table 5 are due to managers 
intentionally or unintentionally prioritizing their explicit pre-tax compensation 
incentives over the after-tax analysts’ earnings forecasts. Regardless of the intentions 
that drive managerial actions, if managers are prioritizing their short-term compensation 
incentives over the analysts’ earnings forecasts then the likelihood of achieving the 
analysts’ target should decrease as managers meet an increasing amount of the 
                                                 
4 In untabulated analyses I look at whether these results are robust to various controls for corporate 
governance quality. In three separate models I control for the size of the board of directors, the percentage 
of independent directors, and the percentage of institutional ownership. Results remain unchanged. 
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performance metrics required for the bonus payout. To examine whether such a 
prioritization of incentives exists, I run my empirical models with additional controls for 
the percentage of AIP payouts received at fiscal year-end. 
 
TABLE 6 
Logistic Analyses of Meeting/Beating Earnings Forecasts Using Tax Account 
Manipulations - Controlling for the Amount of Bonus Received 
Variable Estimate  (p-value) 
    
INTERCEPT -0.895*** (0.000) 
PT_AIP -0.168* (0.094) 
LE to 100 PCT BONUS 0.924* (0.068) 
PT_AIP * LE to 100 PCT BONUS -1.247* (0.080) 
LE to 75 PCT BONUS -0.290 (0.654) 
PT_AIP * LE to 75 PCT BONUS -0.266 (0.780) 
LE to 50 PCT BONUS -0.722 (0.122) 
PT_AIP * LE to 50 PCT BONUS 1.452** (0.042) 
LE to 25 PCT BONUS 0.372 (0.283) 
PT_AIP * LE to 25 PCT BONUS -0.239 (0.653) 
TAX OWED 0.024 (0.480) 
ETR Q3 0.024 (0.517) 
ACCRUALS -0.067** (0.039) 
   
Industry Dummies YES 
Year Dummies YES 
Observations 3658 
Pseudo R2 0.0703 
Notes: Table 6 presents the results of estimating Equation (1) and compares the likelihood of meeting or 
beating analysts' forecasts for firms in which the annual bonus components of executive pay are 
composed strictly of pre-tax accounting metrics against firms in which the annual bonus components of 
executive pay are composed of after-tax metrics, or a mixture of pre-tax and after-tax metrics. The 
analysis is run on 3,658 firm-tear observations that would have missed analysts' forecasts given their 
third quarter ETR (i.e.,  MISS = 1). 
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Table 6 presents the results of estimating Equation (1) with four separate controls 
for the percentage of bonus received at fiscal year-end. I construct these additional 
variables by dividing the actual bonus amount paid out to the CEO by the amount that is 
contractually promised to be paid out if target levels of performance have been met.5 So, 
LE to FULL BONUS is an indicator that equals one if a bonus less than or equal to 100 
percent of the contractually promised target amount has been paid out, whereas LE to 75 
PCT BONUS is an indicator that equals one if a bonus that is less than or equal to 75 
percent of the promised amount has been paid out.6 Once again, the coefficient on 
PT_AIP is negative and significant, which indicates a negative relation between AIPs 
that are composed strictly of pre-tax accounting metrics and the likelihood to meet 
analysts’ EPS targets through tax account manipulations. However, the coefficient on the 
interaction between PT_AIP and LE to 50 PCT BONUS is significantly positive, the 
coefficient on the interaction between PT_AIP and LE to 75 PCT BONUS is statistically 
insignificant, and the coefficient on the interaction between PT_AIP and LE to FULL 
BONUS is significantly negative. These results indicate that although CEOs with AIPs 
that are composed of only pre-tax accounting metrics are less likely to meet analysts’ 
earnings targets at fiscal year-end, this likelihood incrementally decreases as the CEO 
                                                 
5 Information regarding target amounts for individual AIP components, and year-end performance in 
relation to individual AIP components are not available through the InventiveLab database. Therefore, I 
utilize the ratio of actual year-end bonus payouts to contractually promised target bonus amounts in order 
to capture the level of executive performance in relation to AIP targets.  
6 In untabulated analyses I run a different specification of the model in which I construct indicator 
variables to capture whether a bonus that is greater than or equal to 100 percent, between 76 and 99 
percent, between 51 and 75 percent, between 26 and 50 percent, or between 0 and 25 percent of the 
contractually promised target amount was paid out. The results are similar to those that I present in Table 
5.  
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receives closer to 100 percent of the amount that is contractually promised to be paid out 
if target levels of performance have been met. This finding is consistent with the idea 
that managers either intentionally, or unintentionally prioritize their pre-tax short-term 
compensation incentives over the analysts’ after-tax EPS forecasts. Once the CEO 
receives greater than half of the contractually promised bonus amount, the positive 
coefficient on the interaction term disappears. This result points to incentive 
prioritization as a possible reason for the relation that I document in Table 5. 
Studies on executive compensation conclude that compensation contracts should 
contain both short-term and long-term incentives in order to mitigate over- or under-
investment in the short- or the long-run. For instance, Dechow and Sloan (1991) note 
that the inclusion of both long-term and short-term performance measures in executive 
compensation plans indicates that neither measure alone is optimal, and that each 
measure has its own set of costs and benefits. Similarly, in an analytical study on 
compensation form and managerial decision horizons, Narayanan (1996) shows that 
contracts consisting of both long-term and short-term forms of compensation produce 
efficient investment. To determine whether any long-term forms of compensation 
mitigate the influence of short-term compensation incentives on managerial decision 
making, I run my empirical models with additional variables that control for the 
significance of the bonus component within the managers’ overall compensation packet. 
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TABLE 7 
Logistic Analyses of Meeting/Beating Earnings Forecasts Using Tax Account 
Manipulations- Controlling for Bonus as a Percentage of Total Compensation 
and Total Current Compensation 
Variable 
Model I Model II 
Estimate 
 (p-value) 
Estimate 
 (p-value) 
INTERCEPT -0.887*** -0.857*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
PT_AIP -0.173* -0.169* 
 (0.077) (0.090) 
BONUS TOTAL PCT 2.052**  
 (0.039)  
PT_AIP * BONUS TOTAL PCT -4.147***  
 (0.002)  
BONUS TOTAL CURRENT PCT  0.577 
  (0.128) 
PT_AIP * BONUS TOTAL CURRENT PCT  -1.189** 
  (0.018) 
TAX OWED 0.029 0.026 
 (0.380) (0.430) 
ETR Q3 0.026 0.026 
 (0.474) (0.476) 
ACCRUALS -0.065** -0.065** 
 (0.048) (0.046) 
   
Industry Dummies YES YES 
Year Dummies YES YES 
Observations 3,658 3,658 
Pseudo R2 0.069 0.069 
Notes: Table 7 presents the results of estimating a modified version of Equation (1) and compares the 
likelihood of meeting or beating analysts' forecasts for firms in which the annual bonus components of 
executive pay are composed strictly of pre-tax accounting metrics against firms in which the annual 
bonus components of executive pay are composed of after-tax metrics, or a mixture of pre-tax and after-
tax metrics. Model I includes a variable to control for the bonus as a percentage of total compensation, 
whereas Model II includes a variable to control for the bonus as a percentage of current compensation. 
The analysis is run on 3,658 firm-year observations that would have missed analysts' forecasts given 
their third quarter ETR (i.e., MISS = 1).  
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Table 7 reports the results from estimating Equation (1). The dependent variable 
(MBWTAX) is an indicator variable that equals one for firms that met analysts’ 
consensus EPS targets through earnings management via the tax accounts. Model I and 
Model II include the control variables BONUS TOTAL PCT and BONUS TOTAL 
CURRENT PCT, which control for bonus as a percentage of total compensation and total 
current compensation, respectively. The coefficient of PT_AIP is negative and 
significant, which indicates that among a subsample of observations that would have 
missed the forecasted EPS value with their 3rd quarter ETRs (i.e. MISS = 1), those 
observations with AIPs composed only of pre-tax accounting metrics are less likely to 
meet analysts’ earnings targets at fiscal year-end, even in instances where missing the 
forecasted EPS is a virtual certainty. The negative and significant coefficient on the 
interaction between PT_AIP and bonus percentage indicates that the likelihood of 
meeting analysts’ after-tax earnings targets decreases even further as the bonus becomes 
an increasingly larger component of the overall compensation package. Taken together, 
the results that I present in Table 7 Panels A and B indicate that including other forms of 
compensation with a longer horizon could mitigate the influence that short-term 
compensation incentives have on managerial incentive prioritization. 
4.2.2. Self-Selection of AIP Structure and Controlling for Endogeneity 
The results that I present in Tables 4 and 5, which support my first hypothesis, 
have limitations due to the fact that AIP structure is determined endogenously. In order 
to mitigate the endogeneity concerns that are caused by the self-selection of AIP 
structure I utilize a two-stage regression approach. In the first stage I generate a 
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predicted value of the endogenously determined AIP structure variable (i.e. PT_AIP) by 
regressing the AIP structure variable on a set of exogenous control variables and an 
instrumental variable. In the second stage, I regress the variable of interest (i.e. 
MBWTAX) on a set of exogenous control variables and the predicted value generated 
from the first stage regression. In order to properly utilize the two-stage regression 
approach it is important that I select an instrumental variable that not only contains 
useful information about the endogenous AIP structure variable, but also influences the 
dependent variable of interest only by way of the AIP structure variable and is otherwise 
exogenous to the dependent variable of interest. Unfortunately, prior studies on 
executive compensation do not provide insight into potential determinants of AIP 
structure. Therefore, I look at the differences in the characteristics of firms in which the 
annual bonus components of executive pay are composed strictly of pre-tax accounting 
metrics (i.e. observations for which PT_AIP = 1) and firms in which the annual bonus 
components of executive pay are composed of after-tax metrics, or a mixture of pre-tax 
and after-tax metrics (i.e. observations for which PT_AIP = 0). 
Table 8 presents the differences in the mean values of firm characteristics for 
firm-year observations that are classified as PT_AIP = 0 and PT_AIP = 1. There are no 
significant differences in the average levels of free-cash flows (FCF), intangibles 
(INTG), capital expenditures (CAPEX) and market-to-book ratios (MTB) between the 
two sets of firms; however, firms that have AIPs that are composed strictly of pre-tax 
accounting metrics are smaller (SIZE), have less foreign income (FI), less R&D (RND), 
less leverage (LEV), more PP&E (PPE), and are less likely to use compensation 
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TABLE 8 
Differences in the Mean Values of Firm Characteristics for Observations that are 
Classified as PT_AIP = 0 and PT_AIP = 1 
 PT_AIP = 0 PT_AIP = 1 Difference in 
Means Variable N Mean N Mean 
SIZE 4,314 8.840 2,374 8.479 0.361*** 
FI 4,314 0.045 2,374 0.035 0.011*** 
RND 4,314 0.041 2,374 0.056 -0.015*** 
LEV 4,314 0.238 2,374 0.262 -0.024*** 
PPE 4,314 0.289 2,374 0.273 0.015** 
FCF 4,314 0.069 2,374 0.067 0.002 
INTG 4,314 0.247 2,374 0.240 0.006 
MTB 4,314 3.935 2,374 3.312 0.623 
CAPEX 4,314 0.048 2,374 0.048 0.000 
CC_USE 4,314 0.957 2,374 0.942 0.016*** 
Notes: All continuous variables are winsorized at 1% and 99%. The Appendix provides variable 
definitions. 
 
consultants (CC_USE) than firms that have AIPs that are composed of after-tax metrics, 
or a mixture of pre-tax and after-tax metrics.7 Size, foreign income, R&D expenditures 
and PP&E are less likely to be exogenous to the dependent variable of interest, since 
prior studies in tax avoidance have demonstrated that these variables are all associated 
with firms’ effective tax rates (Chen et al., 2010; Dyreng et al., 2008). Compensation 
consultant use is more likely to influence the variable of interest only by way of the AIP 
structure variable and is therefore the instrumental variable that I use as part of the two-
stage regression approach.  
                                                 
7 In untabulated analyses I include FI, RND, LEV, PPE, and CC_USE as control variables. Results remain 
unchanged. 
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TABLE 9 
Panel A 
First Stage Regression of Annual Incentive Plan Structure on Compensation 
Consultant Use and Control Variables 
Variable Estimate (p-value) 
    
INTERCEPT -0.119 
 (0.272) 
CC_USE -0.208* 
  (0.059) 
Panel B 
Second Stage Regression of the Likelihood of Using Tax Account Manipulations 
to Meet or Beat Analysts' Forecasts on Annual Incentive Plan Structure and 
Control Variables 
Variable Estimate (p-value) 
  
INTERCEPT -0.256 
 (0.712) 
Pr(PT_AIP) -0.815* 
 (0.058) 
TAX OWED 0.012 
 (0.545) 
ETR Q3 0.001 
 (0.954) 
ACCRUALS -0.024 
 (0.293) 
  
Industry Dummies YES 
Year Dummies YES 
Observations 3,658 
Pseudo R2 0.068 
Notes: Table 9 presents the results of estimating a two-stage bivariate probit regression. Panel A 
presents the results of the first stage regression, where the endogenously determined AIP structure 
variable is regressed on a set of exogenous control variables and an instrumental variable, which is an 
indicator that equals 1 for firm-year observations where at least one compensation consulting firm was 
used, and 0 otherwise. Panel B presents the results of the second stage regression, where the dependent 
variable of interest is regressed on a set of control variables and the predicted value generated from the 
first stage regression. The analyses are run on 3,658 firm-year observations that would have missed 
analysts' forecasts given their third quarter ETR (i.e., MISS = 1).  
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Table 9 Panel A reports the results from estimating the first stage of the two-
stage regression approach. The dependent variable (PT_AIP) is an indicator variable that 
equals one for firm-year observations for which the CEOs annual incentive plan is 
composed of only metrics that are classified as being pre-tax, and 0 otherwise. The 
instrumental variable (CC_USE) is also an indicator variable that equals one for firm-
year observations for which the focal firm utilized at least one compensation consulting 
firm, and 0 otherwise. The negative and significant coefficient on the instrumental 
variable indicates that the use of a compensation consultant is associated with a 
decreased likelihood of choosing annual incentive plans that are composed of only pre-
tax accounting metrics. This supports the univariate results that I presented in table 8, 
which documented that firms that have AIPs that are composed strictly of pre-tax 
accounting metrics are less likely to utilize compensation consults. Panel B of Table 9 
reports the results from the second stage regression, where the predicted value generated 
in the first stage regression is utilized as the variable of interest (Pr(PT_AIP)) and the 
dependent variable (MBWTAX) is an indicator variable that equals one for firms that met 
analysts’ consensus EPS targets through earnings management via the tax accounts. The 
coefficient of Pr(PT_AIP) is negative and significant, which indicates that among a 
subsample of observations that would have missed the forecasted EPS value with their 
3rd quarter ETRs (i.e. MISS = 1), those observations with AIPs composed only of pre-tax 
accounting metrics are less likely to meet analysts’ earnings targets at fiscal year-end, 
even in instances where missing the forecasted EPS is a virtual certainty. The coefficient 
of -0.815 implies that the odds of manipulating the tax accounts in order to meet or beat 
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the analysts’ EPS target at fiscal year-end decreases by about 55.74 percent for firms that 
have AIPs that are composed of only pre-tax accounting metrics. The results of this 
empirical analyses support the results that I present in Table 5 Panel C; even after 
controlling for endogeneity caused by the self-selection of executive compensation, 
when short-term compensation incentives include only pre-tax performance metrics, 
managers will be less likely to meet analysts’ after-tax earnings targets. 
4.2.3. AIP Structure and the Market Reaction to Firm Performance (H2) 
With my second hypothesis, I examine whether the market reaction surrounding 
the earnings announcements of firms that have missed analysts’ forecasts will be 
incrementally more negative in cases where the short-term compensation incentives 
include only pre-tax performance metrics. Table 10 presents the results of estimating 
Equation (2), where the dependent variable (ANNCAR) is the three-day cumulative 
abnormal returns that surround the earnings announcement. 
Across both specifications of the regression, the coefficient on PT_AIP is not 
significant, which indicates that simply having the AIP structured a certain way does not 
influence the reaction of market participants to the earnings announcement. MISS 
TARGET, which is an indicator variable that equals one for firms that missed analysts’ 
forecasts by fiscal year-end, is negative and significant across all models, which is in 
line with prior studies that have documented the adverse outcomes that result from 
missed analysts’ forecasts. In Model II, the interaction between PT_AIP and MISS 
TARGET is also negative and significant, which indicates that missed analysts’ earnings 
targets is associated with incrementally more negative returns for firms when 
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TABLE 10 
OLS Analyses of the Cumulative Abnormal Reaction Surrounding Earnings 
Announcements 
Variable 
Model I Model II 
Estimate  
(p-value) 
Estimate 
 (p-value) 
      
INTERCEPT 0.626*** 0.600*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
PT_AIP -0.013 0.021 
 (0.639) (0.515) 
MISS TARGET -0.462*** -0.419*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
PT_AIP * MISS TARGET  -0.118* 
  (0.051) 
ANALYST FORECAST ERROR 0.072*** 0.070*** 
 (0.006) (0.008) 
BOOK TO MARKET 0.040* 0.039* 
 (0.065) (0.068) 
MOMENTUM -0.035** -0.035** 
 (0.034) (0.034) 
PERSISTENCE 0.023 0.023 
 (0.128) (0.133) 
SIZE -0.044*** -0.044*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) 
   
Industry Dummies YES YES 
Year Dummies YES YES 
Observations 6,688 6,688 
R2 0.069 0.070 
Notes: Table 10 presents the results of estimating Equation (2) and compares the cumulative abnormal 
reaction surrounding earnings announcements for firms in which the annual bonus components of 
executive pay are composed strictly of pre-tax accounting metrics against firms in which the annual 
bonus components of executive pay are composed of after-tax metrics, or a mixture of pre-tax and after-
tax metrics.  
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the AIPs are composed of only pre-tax performance metrics. Since all continuous 
variables are standardized, the coefficient of -0.118 on the interaction term implies that 
there is a -0.80 cent per share incremental cumulative abnormal reaction to the earnings 
announcements of firms that miss analysts’ earnings targets at fiscal year-end, if those 
firms also have AIPs that are composed of only pre-tax accounting metrics. This result 
provides evidence consistent with my second hypothesis and implies that investors might 
deem the missed EPS target to be partly caused by short-term compensation structures, 
and a result of executives acting in a manner that is inconsistent with the analysts’ after-
tax earnings targets.8 Prior studies looking at the market reaction to compensation-
specific information primarily focused on the market reaction to announcements 
regarding initiations of compensation plans, or changes in compensation plan structures. 
Therefore, this result is novel as it provides some preliminary empirical support 
indicating that market participants incorporate compensation-specific information into 
their decision making processes when reacting to earnings announcements. 
4.3. Additional Analyses 
4.3.1. Market Valuation of Analysts’ Targets and AIP Targets 
Extant research in accounting and finance has empirically demonstrated that 
market participants value analysts’ consensus EPS forecasts as an important indicator of 
firm performance. Firms that fail to achieve analysts’ EPS targets are punished through 
                                                 
8 In untabulated analyses I look at whether these results are robust to various controls for corporate 
governance quality. In three separate models I control for the size of the board of directors, the percentage 
of independent directors, and the percentage of institutional ownership. Results remain unchanged. 
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negative stock price reactions, bad publicity, and a reassessment of firm-specific risk 
levels, whereas firms that meet these targets enjoy higher returns. There is no evidence, 
however, on whether market participants value the targets presented by CEOs’ AIPs in a 
similar manner. Prior studies have been able to show that the market reacts positively to 
the adoption of both short-term and long-term compensation arrangements, however to 
my knowledge no research has examined whether the market reaction surrounding 
earnings announcement is impacted by executives’ successes or failures in meeting the 
goals outlined by their AIPs. Furthermore, the question of whether market participants 
value analysts’ EPS forecasts more than AIP targets, or vice versa, still remains 
unanswered. 
Performance metrics that constitute AIPs are selected by compensation 
committees in order to increase shareholder wealth by motivating executives to improve 
short-term performance (Murphy, 1999). Furthermore, according to Demski and Feltham 
(1979), performance-based compensation arrangements are considered to be too risky 
for less successful individuals, and are used as a method of screening for high quality 
executives. Therefore, meeting AIP targets could be seen by market participants as being 
beneficial to shareholder wealth, and might be viewed as a signal of executive 
competence. 
Bennett et al. (2017) study the relation between compensation goals and firm 
performance and provide evidence that the probability of forced CEO turnover more 
than doubles if the executive has missed an accounting-based performance metric in the 
prior year. Research has demonstrated that forced CEO turnover can have detrimental  
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TABLE 11 
OLS Analyses of the Cumulative Abnormal Reaction Surrounding Earnings 
Announcements - Combinations of Meeting or Missing the Analysts' EPS Target 
and Annual Incentive Plan Targets 
Variable Estimate  (p-value) 
    
INTERCEPT 0.146*** (0.010) 
MB 0.465*** (0.000) 
GTE 50 PCT BONUS 0.029 (0.570) 
MB x GTE 50 PCT BONUS -0.017 (0.754) 
LT 50 PCT BONUS -0.072 (0.516) 
MB x LT 50 PCT BONUS 0.092 (0.469) 
ANALYST FORECAST ERROR 0.072*** (0.006) 
BOOK TO MARKET 0.040* (0.066) 
MOMENTUM -0.034** (0.035) 
PERSISTENCE 0.023 (0.135) 
SIZE -0.043*** (0.001) 
   
Industry Dummies YES 
Year Dummies YES 
Observations 6,688 
R2 0.069 
Notes: Table 11 presents the results of estimating a modified version of Equation (2) and compares the 
cumulative abnormal reaction surrounding earnings announcements across firms that have 
combinations of meeting or missing the analysts' EPS target and meeting or missing the annual 
incentive plan targets.  
 
effects on firm investing and financial reporting decisions (Elliot and Shaw, 1988; 
Moore, 1973; Pourciau, 1993; Strong and Meyer, 1987; Weisbach, 1995). Therefore, 
missed AIP targets could send a negative signal to market participants regarding CEO 
and firm performance.  
As there are tangible consequences to both meeting and missing the targets 
presented by the CEO’s AIP, it may be the case that AIP targets are as influential in 
market participants’ decision making processes as analysts’ EPS forecasts. I examine 
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this issue in Table 11, which presents the results of estimating a modified version of 
Equation (2) and compares the cumulative abnormal reaction surrounding the earnings 
announcements (ANNCAR) of firms that have combinations of meeting or missing the 
analysts’ EPS target and meeting or missing the CEO’s AIP targets. 
The variables of interest are indicator variables that track whether the firm has 
met the analysts’ earnings forecast at fiscal year-end (i.e. MB), and whether the CEO has 
received a bonus that is greater than or equal to 50 percent of the contractually promised 
target amount, or less than 50 percent of the contractually promised target amount at 
fiscal year-end (i.e. GTE 50 PCT BONUS and LT 50 PCT BONUS).9 The coefficient on 
MB is positive and significant, which is consistent with prior research that demonstrates 
market participants rewarding firms that achieve analysts’ earnings targets. The 
coefficients on the main effects of the GTE 50 PCT BONUS and LT 50 PCT BONUS 
variables, as well as the coefficients on the interactions between MB and these variables 
are not statistically significant. This result is of interest because it indicates that meeting 
or missing the targets outlined by AIPs does not incrementally influence the market’s 
valuation decision. The results presented in Table 11 indicate that the analysts’ 
consensus EPS forecast is a much more significant indicator of firm performance for 
market participants. Even though the targets that make up the CEO’s AIPs might be 
chosen by the compensation committee in order to maximize shareholder value, this 
                                                 
9 In untabulated analyses I change the cut-offs for bonus payouts. I rerun these empirical analyses with 
controls to track whether greater than or equal to 75 percent, or less than or equal to 25 percent of the 
contractually promised bonus amount was paid out to the CEO. I rerun these analyses once more with 
controls to track whether greater than or equal to 90 percent, or less than or equal to 10 percent of the 
contractually promised bonus amount was paid out to the CEO. Results remain unchanged. 
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analysis shows that the analysts’ EPS target takes precedence for the market, as it is 
factored into market participants’ decision making processes. 
4.3.2. Analysts’ Targets, AIP targets, and Long-Run Operating Performance 
Prior studies in accounting have empirically demonstrated the negative 
consequences that accrue to firms that miss analysts’ forecasted earnings targets (Brown 
et al., 1987; Matsumoto, 2002; Mastunaga and Park, 2001; Schrand and Wong, 2003; 
Skinner and Sloan, 2001). These consequences range from negative stock price reactions 
surrounding earnings announcements, to bad publicity for the firm, or a reassessment of 
the firm’s inherent risk. Although research on executive compensation has established an 
association between missed accounting-based performance metrics and an increased 
likelihood of forced CEO turnover (Bennett et al., 2017), to my knowledge there is a 
lack of studies that examine whether firms experience adverse operational outcomes 
when executives miss their AIP targets. I investigate whether any long-run consequences 
accrue to firm-year observations that have either met or missed the analysts’ EPS target 
and the CEO’s AIP targets at fiscal year-end. Furthermore, I demonstrate whether 
missing (meeting) one of these two targets is more detrimental (beneficial) to firm 
performance in the long-run. 
Table 12 presents the long-run operating consequences for firms that either meet 
or miss the analysts’ EPS target, while simultaneously either paying out greater than or 
equal to 50 percent, or less than 50 percent of the contractually promised AIP target   
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TABLE 12 
Long-Run Operating Performance of Firms - Combinations of Meeting or Missing the Analysts' EPS Target and 
Annual Incentive Plan Targets 
Panel A: Return on Assets 
 ROAt ROAt+1 ROAt+2 ROAt+3 
MEET TARGET & GTE 50 PCT BONUS 0.071 0.068 0.066 0.066 
MEET TARGET & LT 50 PCT BONUS 0.066 0.066 0.062 0.063 
MISS TARGET & GTE 50 PCT BONUS 0.042 0.039 0.043 0.047 
MISS TARGET & LT 50 PCT BONUS 0.047 0.035 0.041 0.047 
     
Differences in Means ROAt ROAt+1 ROAt+2 ROAt+3 
MEET TARGET & LT 50 PCT BONUS vs MEET TARGET & GTE 50 PCT 
BONUS -2.11** -0.63 -1.33 -1.15 
MISS TARGET & LT 50 PCT BONUS vs. MISS TARGET & GTE 50 PCT 
BONUS 1.28 -1.09 -0.61 0.15 
MISS TARGET & GTE 50 PCT BONUS vs. MEET TARGET & GTE 50 PCT 
BONUS -8.79*** -8.56*** -6.70*** -5.89*** 
MISS TARGET & LT 50 PCT BONUS vs. MEET TARGET & LT 50 PCT 
BONUS -6.11*** -10.06*** -6.42*** -4.20*** 
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TABLE 12 CONTINUED 
Panel B: Market to Book 
 MTBt MTBt+1 MTBt+2 MTBt+3 
MEET TARGET & GTE 50 PCT BONUS 3.227 3.121 3.211 3.423 
MEET TARGET & LT 50 PCT BONUS 3.531 3.862 3.687 3.625 
MISS TARGET & GTE 50 PCT BONUS 2.853 2.742 2.934 3.111 
MISS TARGET & LT 50 PCT BONUS 3.085 3.065 3.117 3.403 
     
Differences in Means MTBt MTBt+1 MTBt+2 MTBt+3 
MEET TARGET & LT 50 PCT BONUS vs MEET TARGET & GTE 50 PCT BONUS 2.30** 5.34*** 3.25*** 1.24 
MISS TARGET & LT 50 PCT BONUS vs. MISS TARGET & GTE 50 PCT BONUS 1.13 1.41 0.72 1.03 
MISS TARGET & GTE 50 PCT BONUS vs. MEET TARGET & GTE 50 PCT BONUS -2.25** -2.32** -1.57 -1.59 
MISS TARGET & LT 50 PCT BONUS vs. MEET TARGET & LT 50 PCT BONUS -2.44** -3.84*** -2.52** -0.87 
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TABLE 12 CONTINUED 
Panel C: Capital Expenditures + Research & Development Expenditures 
 CAP_RNDt CAP_RNDt+1 CAP_RNDt+2 CAP_RNDt+3 
MEET TARGET & GTE 50 PCT BONUS 0.048 0.047 0.046 0.044 
MEET TARGET & LT 50 PCT BONUS 0.046 0.044 0.043 0.043 
MISS TARGET & GTE 50 PCT BONUS 0.049 0.046 0.044 0.043 
MISS TARGET & LT 50 PCT BONUS 0.053 0.049 0.047 0.048 
     
Differences in Means CAP_RNDt CAP_RNDt+1 CAP_RNDt+2 CAP_RNDt+3 
MEET TARGET & LT 50 PCT BONUS vs MEET TARGET 
& GTE 50 PCT BONUS -1.61 -2.15** -2.37** -0.97 
MISS TARGET & LT 50 PCT BONUS vs. MISS TARGET 
& GTE 50 PCT BONUS 1.60 1.28 1.31 1.72* 
MISS TARGET & GTE 50 PCT BONUS vs. MEET 
TARGET & GTE 50 PCT BONUS 0.55 -0.19 -0.96 -0.45 
MISS TARGET & LT 50 PCT BONUS vs. MEET TARGET 
& LT 50 PCT BONUS 3.83*** 3.09*** 2.44** 2.30** 
Notes: Table 12 presents the long-run operating consequences for firms that have combinations of meeting or missing the analysts' target and 
receiving greater than or equal to 50 percent or less than 50 percent of the contractually promised annual incentive plan payout amount. *, **, *** 
indicates statistical significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels of significance, respectively. All continuous variables have been standardized and 
winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles. 
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amount to the CEO.10 Following Bhojraj et al. (2009), I capture long-run operating 
consequences by examining the mean values of return on assets (ROA), market-to-book 
ratio (MTB), and the joint total of R&D and capital expenditures (CAP_RND) for firms 
in years t, t + 1, t + 2, and t + 3. I categorize firm-year observations based on 
performance regarding meeting or missing the analysts’ EPS forecasts and the CEO’s 
AIP targets. In order to determine how firm performance influences long-run operational 
outcomes, I observe the differences in the mean values of ROA, MTB, and CAP_RND 
across firm-year observations that have combinations of meeting and missing the 
analysts’ EPS forecasts and the CEO’s AIP targets. Across all comparison groups, I hold 
the status of one of the two targets constant in order to observe the impact that changes 
in the status of a single target have on long-run performance. 
Results of the differences in means analyses presented in Table 12 indicate that 
missed analysts’ forecasted EPS targets at fiscal year-end are more detrimental to long-
run operational performance than missed AIP targets. Firms that are classified as MISS 
TARGET & GTE 50 PCT BONUS have long-run ROA, MTB, and CAP_RND values that 
are statistically significantly less than the corresponding values for firms that are 
classified as MEET TARGET & GTE 50 PCT BONUS. Similarly, firms that are classified 
as MISS TARGET & LT 50 PCT BONUS have long-run ROA, MTB, and CAP_RND 
values that are statistically significantly less than the corresponding values for firms that 
                                                 
10 In untabulated analyses I change the cut-offs for bonus payouts. I rerun these empirical analyses with 
controls to track whether greater than or equal to 75 percent, or less than or equal to 25 percent of the 
contractually promised bonus amount was paid out to the CEO. I rerun these analyses once more with 
controls to track whether greater than or equal to 90 percent, or less than or equal to 10 percent of the 
contractually promised bonus amount was paid out to the CEO. Results remain unchanged. 
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are classified as MEET TARGET & LT 50 PCT BONUS. Long run performance is not 
significantly different between MEET TARGET & LT 50 PCT BONUS and MEET 
TARGET & GTE 50 PCT BONUS for ROA and CAP_RND; similarly, there are no 
differences in these values between MISS TARGET & LT 50 PCT BONUS and MISS 
TARGET & GTE 50 PCT BONUS. So, irrespective of how the CEO performs with 
regards to the targets presented by the AIP, firms that miss analysts’ consensus EPS 
targets perform worse in the long-run than firms that meet analysts’ targets. The same 
cannot be said in instances where firm performance regarding the analysts’ forecasted 
EPS target is held constant, and CEO performance in relation to the AIP targets changes. 
In summary, this analysis shows that firms that miss the analysts’ earnings 
forecast seem to suffer from poor long-run operational performance as it relates to return 
on assets, market-to-book ratios, and investment in R&D as well as capital expenditures. 
Whereas firms do not seem to suffer similar adverse outcomes in instances where the 
CEO fails to achieve the targets presented by AIPs. 
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5. CONCLUSIONS 
 
In this paper, I examine how managers contend with multiple incentives. The 
outcomes of managers’ decisions resulting from these incentives directly affect firm 
performance; consequently, I also examine how managers’ compensation incentives 
affect market participants’ reaction to firm performance.  
I find that when compensation incentives are based on pre-tax performance 
metrics, managers are less likely to meet analysts’ after-tax earnings targets. So, 
although compensation committees are decreasing their use of EPS as a compensation 
metric (Equilar, 2016), a consequence of this decrease is an increased likelihood that 
managers, unintentionally or intentionally, prioritize meeting their compensation 
incentives over analysts’ earnings targets at fiscal year-end. Furthermore, my results 
demonstrate that the negative market reaction surrounding the earnings announcements 
of firms that miss analysts’ EPS targets are incrementally larger in instances where 
CEOs’ compensation incentives include only pre-tax performance metrics. Under such 
circumstances, investors could deem missed analysts’ forecasts to be an adverse 
outcome of compensation structure and a result of the executives acting in their own best 
interests, and not behaving consistent with the value-maximizing goals of the firm.  
Prior work on executive remuneration documents an association between short-
term incentive contracts and the accrual decisions of managers (Balsam, 1998; Gaver et 
al., 1995; Guidry et al., 1999; Healy, 1985; Holthausen et al., 1995). Research in this 
area also demonstrates an association between short-term incentive compensation and 
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firm-level tax and financial outcomes (Armstrong et al., 2015; Gaertner, 2014; Phillips, 
2003; Powers et al., 2016). This study adds to the literature by demonstrating an 
association between compensation incentives and the likelihood of meeting analysts’ 
forecasts. Furthermore, the market reaction tests provide empirical evidence that market 
participants impound compensation specific information into their decision making 
processes when reacting to firm performance. Extant literature in accounting has 
demonstrated that market participants react to the adoption of different compensation 
plans (Brickley et al., 1985; DeFusco et al., 1990; Tehranian and Waegelein, 1985); 
however, research on investors’ reactions to firm performance surrounding analysts’ 
forecasts reveals a singular focus on whether the firm was able to meet the benchmarks 
set by analysts (Bartov et al., 2002). I add to this stream of literature by showing that 
market participants impound information regarding compensation structure into their 
firm valuation decisions.  
The results of my study may be of interest to compensation committees, 
managers, and market participants. As they pertain to compensation committees, my 
results suggest that removing EPS as a compensation benchmark will shift managerial 
focus away from analysts’ EPS forecasts. Additionally, my results can help managers 
discern how the prioritization of different incentives might affect market participants’ 
evaluation of firm performance. Because investors value analysts’ EPS forecasts as an 
indicator of firm performance, my results can give them an insight into how incentives 
chosen by the compensation committee to improve firm performance and increase 
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shareholder wealth (Murphy, 1999) might affect firm performance relative to the 
analysts’ EPS forecast. 
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APPENDIX 
VARIABLE DEFINITIONS 
 
Dependent Variables 
MBWTAX An indicator variable equal to 1 for firms that would 
have missed analysts’ forecasted earnings targets at 
fiscal year-end using their third quarter ETR, but ended 
up meeting or beating analysts’ forecasts with their year-
end ETR, and 0 otherwise. 
ANNCAR Cumulative return for the firm for the three trading-day 
window around the earnings announcement (day –1 to 
day +1) minus the cumulative return for an equal-
weighted portfolio of firms in the same CRSP size 
decile. 
Independent Variables 
PT_AIP An indicator variable equal to 1 for firm-year 
observations for which the CEOs annual incentive plan 
is composed of only metrics that are classified as being 
pre-tax, and 0 otherwise. 
MISS An indicator variable equal to 1 for firms that are at risk 
of meeting analysts’ forecasted earnings targets at fiscal 
year-end using their third quarter ETR, and 0 otherwise. 
MISS_TARGET An indicator variable equal to 1 for firms that do not 
meet analysts’ forecasted earnings targets at fiscal year-
end, and 0 otherwise. 
MB An indicator variable equal to 1 for firms that meet 
analysts’ forecasted earnings targets at fiscal year-end, 
and 0 otherwise. 
TAX_OWED Taxes payable minus tax refund receivable divided by 
pretax income. 
ETRQ3 Total income taxes through three quarters divided by 
pretax income through three quarters. 
ACCRUALS Total accruals scaled by pre-tax book income, as 
specified by Dhaliwal et al. (2004). 
AFE Actual EPS minus the last consensus analyst forecast for 
EPS. 
BM Lagged book value of equity divided by lagged market 
value of equity. 
SIZE Natural logarithm of total assets. 
MOMENTUM Cumulative size-adjusted returns for the six months 
preceding the earnings announcement. 
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PERSISTENCE Firm-specific prior period persistence of the fourth 
quarter tax component of earnings, following Gleason 
and Mills (2008). 
MTB Lagged market value of equity divided by lagged book 
value of equity. 
ROA Pretax book income scaled by lagged total assets. 
CAP_RND Sum of capital expenditures and research and 
development expenditures scaled by lagged total assets. 
FI Pre-tax foreign income scaled by lagged total assets. 
RND Research and development expenditures scaled by 
lagged total assets. 
LEV Total long-term debt scaled by lagged total assets. 
PPE Total property, plant and equipment expenditures scaled 
by lagged total assets. 
FCF Operating activities net of cash flows minus total capital 
expenditures scaled by lagged total assets. 
INTG Total intangible assets scaled by lagged total assets. 
CAPEX Capital expenditures scaled by lagged total assets. 
CC_USE An indicator variable equal to 1 for firm-year 
observations that have used at least one compensation 
consulting firm, and 0 otherwise. 
BONUS TOTAL PCT Bonus as a percentage of total compensation. 
BONUS TOTAL 
CURRENT PCT 
Bonus as a percentage of total current compensation. 
LE to 100 PCT BONUS An indicator variable equal to 1 if the annual bonus paid 
out to the CEO is less than or equal to 100 percent but 
greater than 0 percent of the contractually promised 
target amount, and 0 otherwise. 
LE to 75 PCT BONUS An indicator variable equal to 1 if the annual bonus paid 
out to the CEO is less than or equal to 75 percent but 
greater than 0 percent of the contractually promised 
target amount, and 0 otherwise. 
LE to 50 PCT BONUS An indicator variable equal to 1 if the annual bonus paid 
out to the CEO is less than or equal to 50 percent but 
greater than 0 percent of the contractually promised 
target amount, and 0 otherwise. 
LE to 25 PCT BONUS An indicator variable equal to 1 if the annual bonus paid 
out the CEO is less than or equal to 25 percent but 
greater than 0 percent of the contractually promised 
target amount, and 0 otherwise. 
GTE 50 PCT BONUS An indicator variable equal to 1 if the annual bonus paid 
out to the CEO is greater than or equal to 50 percent of 
the contractually promised target amount, and 0 
otherwise. 
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LT 50 PCT BONUS An indicator variable equal to 1 if the annual bonus paid 
out to the CEO is less than 50 percent of the 
contractually promised target amount, and 0 otherwise. 
MEET TARGET & GTE 50 
PCT BONUS 
An indicator variable equal to 1 if the firm meets or 
beats the analysts’ forecasted earnings target at fiscal 
year-end, and the annual bonus paid out to the CEO is 
greater than or equal to 50 percent of the contractually 
promised target amount, and 0 otherwise. 
MEET TARGET & LT 50 
PCT BONUS 
An indicator variable equal to 1 if the firm meets or 
beats the analysts’ forecasted earnings target at fiscal 
year-end, and the annual bonus paid out to the CEO is 
less than 50 percent of the contractually promised target 
amount, and 0 otherwise. 
MISS TARGET & GTE 50 
PCT BONUS 
An indicator variable equal to 1 if the firm misses the 
analysts’ forecasted earnings target at fiscal year-end, 
and the annual bonus paid out to the CEO is greater than 
or equal to 50 percent of the contractually promised 
target amount, and 0 otherwise. 
MISS TARGET & LT 50 
PCT BONUS 
An indicator variable equal to 1 if the firm misses the 
analysts; forecasted earnings target at fiscal year-end, 
and the annual bonus paid out to the CEO is less than 50 
percent of the contractually promised target amount, and 
0 otherwise. 
 
 
 
 
 
